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ABSTRACT
Gradient tree boosting (e.g. XGB1) is one of the most widely used
machine learning models in practice. How to build a secure XGB in
face of data isolation problem becomes a hot research topic. How-
ever, existing works tend to leak intermediate information and thus
raise potential privacy risk. In this paper, we propose a novel frame-
work for two parties to build secure XGB with vertically partitioned
data. Specifically, we associate Homomorphic Encryption (HE) do-
main with Secret Sharing (SS) domain by providing the two-way
transformation primitives. The framework generally promotes the
efficiency for privacy preserving machine learning and offers the
flexibility to implement other machine learning models. Then we
elaborate two secure XGB training algorithms as well as a corre-
sponding prediction algorithm under the hybrid security domains.
Next, we compare our proposed two training algorithms through
both complexity analysis and experiments. Finally, we verify the
model performance on benchmark dataset and further apply our
work to a real-world scenario.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the concern of data privacy and the requirement of better
machine learning models which are collaboratively built by multi-
ple parties, Privacy Preserving Machine Learning (PPML) [22] has
been drawing much attention recently. To date, most existing PPML
models only focus on linear regression [11, 13], logistic regression
[2, 14, 22], and neural network [27, 30, 37]. And they are divided
1https://xgboost.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
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into two types based on how data is partitioned, i.e., horizontally
partitioned PPML that assumes each party has a subset of the sam-
ples with the same features, and vertically partitioned PPML that
supposes each party has the same samples but different features
[34]. The former usually appears when participants are individual
customers (2C), while the latter is more common when participants
are business organizations (2B). In this paper, we focus on the later
setting.
Gradient tree boosting is one of the most widely used machine
learning models that shines in different fields, e.g., fraud detection
[28], recommender system [36], and online advertisement [19]. As
an optimized implementation, XGB [3] achieves promising results
in various competitions and real-world applications, since it is a
gradient boosting model whose key idea is applying numerical op-
timization in function space and optimizing over the cost functions
directly [10] . Therefore, how to build privacy preserving XGB with
vertically partitioned data is an important research topic.
So far, there are several existing researches on privacy preserving
gradient tree boosting [4, 9, 16, 20]. Among them, [16, 20] are
raised for horizontally partitioned data setting. Although privacy
preserving XGB are proposed for vertically partitioned data setting
in [4, 9], they are not provable secure. Specifically, intermediate
information, e.g., the sum of the first and second order gradients
for each split and the order of split gains, are revealed during model
training procedure.
Building a secure XGB is challenging due to the following rea-
sons. (1) Complicated computation primitives. Unlike other machine
learning models such as logistic regression where the required prim-
itives are matrix addition and multiplication, XGB need additional
non-linear computation primitives, e.g., division and argmax. (2)
High memory cost. Most models such as neural network are suitable
for mini-batch training, that is, only a small batch of samples are
loaded in each training epoch, and thus they do not need large mem-
ory to support large-scale datasets. In contrast, XGB uses (sampled)
full-batch dataset to build trees. Therefore, how to save memory
cost is the key to large-scale secure XGB.
To solve the above challenges, in this paper, we propose a hybrid-
domain framework for secure XGB. Our key idea is regarding XGB
as a function that two vertically partitioned parties want to com-
pute securely, during which all of the information is either secretly
shared or encrypted except for the decision trees as the function
output. To be specific, we first present two security domains, i.e.,
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and Secret Sharing (SS). Both do-
mains provide efficient computation primitives, e.g., HADD and SADD
which are the addition primitives under HE domain and SS domain
respectively. Then, we propose transformation primitives between
these two domains, i.e., H2S and S2H. We set up a secure frame-
work with both security domains and implement two secure XGB
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training algorithms with the primitives, i.e., SS-XGB within SS do-
main only and HESS-XGB that employs both HE and SS domains.
SS-XGB is computationally efficient but sustains high communi-
cation cost when handling sparse features, which is usually the
bottleneck of PPML in practice. In contrast, HESS-XGB cuts down
the communication cost by involving extra encryption/decryption
operations. After training, each party holds a partial tree structure
and the secretly shared leaf weights. Next, we present a secure XGB
prediction algorithm for two parties to make predictions efficiently
based on their own features, tree structures and leaf weights. We
also present how to implement SS-XGB & HESS-XGB and analyze
their complexities. Finally, we verify the model performance by
conducting experiments on benchmark dataset and explaining our
real-world applications. We summarize our contributions below:
• We propose to combine the two classical security computation
domains (i.e., HE and SS) so as to deal with secure machine
learning tasks. Our hybrid-domain framework can significantly
boost the efficiency of sparse matrix multiplication, which makes
it practical for industrial scenarios.
• We design novel secure XGB training algorithms (SS-XGB and
HESS-XGB) and corresponding prediction algorithm based on
the framework. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first prov-
able secure XGB under semi-honest adversaries in literature. We
also analyze the complexity of SS-XGB and HESS-XGB, which
is a selection guide given the dataset and specified environment
settings (e.g., network status).
• We conduct experiments on benchmark dataset and the results
demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed
secure XGB algorithms. Our real-world application also shows
the feasibility of our proposal.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we review related literature in two types, i.e., cryp-
tography based secure decision tree and privacy preserving XGB.
2.1 Secure Decision Tree
Existing works on cryptography based secure decision tree come
in two types, i.e., secure training and secure prediction.
Training.Most secure tree building (training) approaches choose
the Iterative Dichotomizer 3 (ID3) [26] algorithm to build decision
trees. For example, the first secure decision tree was proposed
by Lindell & Pinkas [18], where they assume data are horizontally
partitioned over two parties and their protocol is based on oblivious
transfer [23] and Yao’s garbled circuit [35]. Later on, Hoogh et al.,
proposed a secret sharing based secure ID3 protocol [7] which is
suitable for any number of participants who horizontally partition
the dataset. Protocols in [8, 31] are for secure ID3 over vertically
partitioned data, assuming that all parties have the class attribute.
Prediction.Another line of works is the secure prediction (scoring)
of decision tree [6, 15, 32]. They assume that there is a server who
holds a decision tree and a client who provides private features.
After the protocol, the client obtains the classification result, with-
out learning any information about the tree beyond its size and the
prediction output, and the server learns nothing about the client’s
input features [15]. There are also works on securely evaluating
ID3 over horizontally partitioned data for more than two parties
by homomorphic encryption [29, 33].
In this paper, instead of focusing on secure ID3, we aim to build
secure gradient tree boosting training and prediction algorithms,
which are more effective but complicated than ID3.
2.2 Privacy Preserving Gradient Tree Boosting
Besides secure decision tree, there are also several researches on
privacy preserving gradient tree boosting. For example, [20] and
[16] proposed federated gradient boosting decision tree and fed-
erated XGB under federated learning setting, respectively. That is,
they assume data samples with the same features are distributed
horizontally among mobile devices or multiple parties.
Meanwhile, the authors of [4, 9] proposed privacy preserving
XGB for vertically partitioned data setting. They are the most simi-
lar work to ours in literature. However, they are not provable secure.
As we described in Section 1, intermediate information are revealed
during model training procedure. What is more, the leaked infor-
mation cannot be quantified, which may cause potential privacy
leakage in practice. In contrast, in this paper, we present a prov-
able secure XGB by proposing a hybrid-domain secure multi-party
computation framework.
3 PRELIMINARY
In this section, we first declare the algorithm target and correspond-
ing data settings. Then the key derivation of XGB algorithm is
analyzed, which is necessary for the following pseudocodes. Fur-
ther, the computation primitives in use are described in the final
part and related simplified notations are applied in the pseudocodes.
With the notations, we can get rid of the distributed computation
details and provide a high-level description for the algorithm.
3.1 Settings
Scenario setting. Our proposal utilizes the data from two coop-
erators to build a XGB model securely. Two joint parties A & B
align their common samples and obtain different features. In this
way, the dataset is regarded as vertically partitioned. The feature
matrix XM×N , with M samples, is represented by two matrices
XA : {xA}M×NA and XB : {xB }M×NB , where N = NA + NB is the
total feature number. The label vector Y : {y}M locates at one of
the parties. A matrix or vector is denoted by braces and subscripted
by the data size. While referring to a specific element, we write a
representative element in lowercase and a superscript with its in-
dexes, e.g.XA : {xA}i, j . The final model after training is distributed
to both parties who share the same tree structures, but the split
information is only available to the feature owner. Dummy nodes
are created on the other party. The leaf weights are maintained as
secret shares by default. By this output definition, we minimize the
information to be revealed and avoid potential leakage.
Security setting. Our proposal enjoys information-theoretic secu-
rity and are secure in the semi-honest adversarial setting. That is,
the adversary is not restricted to be a probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm, and tries to infer information although it strictly obey
the execution protocol. This setting is adopted by most existing
secure machine learning models [21, 22, 30].
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3.2 XGB
XGB follows the gradient boosting framework and applies numer-
ical optimization in function space[10]. In machine learning,the
learning task is based on the definition of the loss function. The
loss function l(y, yˆ) is defined to measure the difference between
the label y and the estimation yˆ(e.g. Log-Loss).
As an addictive model, XGB[3] minimizes the loss sum of all the
samples as objective iteratively. For each tree fitting, the algorithm
first calculates necessary statistics, i.e.the first-order gradient дi
and second-order gradient hi of sample i:
дi = ∂yˆ (t−1)i
l(yi , yˆ(t−1)i ), hi = ∂2yˆ (t−1)i
l(yi , yˆ(t−1)i ), (1)
where yˆ(t−1)i is the prediction by the end of last iteration.
Then the derivatives sum can be cumulated for the instance set
Ij on each node j:
G j =
∑
i ∈Ij
дi , Hj =
∑
i ∈Ij
hi . (2)
It takes the second-order Taylor expansion approximation of
objective and adds regularization to the model. The optimal leaf
weightw∗j and objective obj
∗ are solved with regard to the objective
function:
w∗j = −
G j
Hj + λ
, (3)
obj∗ = −12
T∑
j=1
G2j
Hj + λ
+ γT , (4)
where γ and λ are the regularizers for the leaf number and leaf
weights respectively. Equation (4) is applied to measure a split
proposal at each node and determines the tree structure. With
Equation (3), the leaf weights are finally acquired.
3.3 Security Domains
Our proposed framework combines Homomorphic Encryption and
Secret Sharing, which are used as standalone solutions to security
multi-party computation. Both methods provide secure compu-
tation environments for variables, so we introduce the concept
Security Domain to distinguish variables in different environments.
There are three variable types and the security requirements:
Norm: the Normal variable x can be a private variable of one
party or a public constant shared by both parties, e.g., the original
private feature matrix held by party A or the public learning rate
of the algorithm. These variables can only be revealed to the party
who owns them, but not to the other party.
HE: the variables protected by Homomorphic Encryption schema.
Both parties exchange their Public Key PKA & PKB with each
other. We denote variables under HE domain by square brackets,
e.g. [x]A, which stands for the ciphertext of x encrypted by PKA and
can be decrypted by Secret Key SKA. There are two requirements
to ensure the domain security. Firstly, if the original data holder
and the encrypter are not the same party, the cipertext cannot be
accessed by the encrypter. Secondly, the encrypted intermediate
values computed by the original variables by different parties cannot
be access by the encrypter. The typical computation schema in this
domain is regarding one party as an encrypter and the other as a
calculator. All the computations is conducted by the calculator with
ciphertexts. Because the calculator party has no access to the secret
key of encrypter party, the original variables and computations are
secure.
SS: the variable in Secret Sharing domain is denoted by angle
brackets, e.g. ⟨x⟩, which consists of two random shares ⟨x⟩A and
⟨x⟩B physically distributed at the two parties. According to the def-
inition of additive secret sharing, we have x = ⟨x⟩A + ⟨x⟩B mod 2k
to reconstruct the original variable, where 2k is the size of finite
field. Note that we omit 2k for conciseness below. In SS domain,
the messages are random values and reveal nothing about original
data. To maintain the security of private variables, the share of
the original data holder cannot be get by the other party. Besides,
the shares of the intermediate values on both parties cannot be
exchanged.
In order to make use of the characteristics of both domains,
variables are transformed between two domains when specific
optimization is needed.
3.4 Computation Primitives
We introduce the brokenbar to separate the data hold by two parties,
i.e., (party A ¦ party B). For example, (⟨x⟩A ¦ ⟨x⟩B , [y]A) means
party A obtains the one partial share of x and party B obtains the
other partial share of x along with the cipertext of y encrypted
by PKA. We then present the computation primitives used in this
paper as follows.
N2S: Transforms a Norm variable x into a SS variable with two
shares(⟨x⟩A & ⟨x⟩B ), having x = ⟨x⟩A + ⟨x⟩B :
N2S : x 7→ (⟨x⟩A ¦ ⟨x⟩B ) , (5)
where one share is randomly generated in the finite field and the
other is computed by subtraction. The variables are privately held
by two parties as a SS variable for further secure computations. We
denote the transformation as ⟨x⟩ = N 2S(x) for simplicity.
HADD: Add two HE variables and get the ciphertext of their
original sum as the result, having z = x + y:
HADD : ( ¦ [x]A, [y]A) 7→ ( ¦ [z]A),
HADD : ([x]B , [y]B ¦ ) 7→ ([z]B ¦ ). (6)
Here, one party acts as the encrypter, and the other party adds the
ciphertexts using additive homomorphic encryption. We denote
the computation as [z]A = [x]A + [y]A for simplicity.
SADD: Add two SS variables and get a new SS variable of their
original sum as the result, having z = x + y:
SADD : (⟨x⟩A , ⟨y⟩A ¦ ⟨x⟩B , ⟨y⟩B ) 7→ (⟨z⟩A ¦ ⟨z⟩B ). (7)
This can be done by summing the local partial shares of the two
inputs, i.e. ⟨z⟩A = ⟨x⟩A + ⟨y⟩A , ⟨z⟩B = ⟨x⟩B + ⟨y⟩B . We denote the
computation as ⟨z⟩ = ⟨x⟩ + ⟨y⟩ for simplicity.
SSUB: Compute the subtraction for two SS variables and get a
new SS variable of their original difference as the result, having
z = x − y:
SSUB : (⟨x⟩A , ⟨y⟩A ¦ ⟨x⟩B , ⟨y⟩B ) 7→ (⟨z⟩A ¦ ⟨z⟩B ). (8)
Similarly to SADD, we denote the computation as ⟨z⟩ = ⟨x⟩ − ⟨y⟩
for simplicity.
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A B
B1. Init a random number as a share <x>B
B2. Encrypt -<x>B with PKA with [-<x>B ]A
B3. Calculate [-<x> B]A +[x]A=[x-<x> B ]A = [<x>A]A
Input PKA, [x]A
[<x>A]A
A1. Decrypt [<x>A]A with SKA get <x>A
SKA
Process
Output <x>B<x>A
Figure 1: H2S primitive
SMUL: Multiply two SS variables and get a new SS variable of
their original product as the result, having z = x · y:
SMUL : (⟨x⟩A , ⟨y⟩A ¦ ⟨x⟩B , ⟨y⟩B ) 7→ (⟨z⟩A ¦ ⟨z⟩B ). (9)
This primitive is done by using Beaver’s triplet technique(see [1]
for more details) . We denote the computation as ⟨z⟩ = ⟨x⟩ · ⟨y⟩ for
simplicity.
SDIV: Divide two SS variables and get a new SS variable of their
original quotient as the result, having z = x/y:
SDIV : (⟨x⟩A , ⟨y⟩A ¦ ⟨x⟩B , ⟨y⟩B ) 7→ (⟨z⟩A ¦ ⟨z⟩B ). (10)
This primitive is implemented with the numerical optimization
algorithms. The functional iteration methods are expanded to se-
cure division, e.g. GoldschmidtâĂŹs series expansion algorithm[12].
Then the division can be approximated and computed with the
SMUL & SADD. With proper initial approximation, the conver-
gence is guaranteed. We denote the computation as ⟨z⟩ = ⟨x⟩ /⟨y⟩
for simplicity.
SARGMAX: Take a matrix of SS variables as input and return
the indexes of the variable with max original value:
SARGMAX : ({⟨x⟩A}i, j ¦ {⟨x⟩B }i, j ) 7→ arg maxi, j ({x}
i, j ). (11)
In practice, the indexes are SS variables for the sake of security.
In our algorithm, the output of SARGMAX is the permuted fea-
ture bucket indexes without leaking the order infomation. So we
skip the reveal process and denote the computation as (i, j) =
arg max
i, j
({⟨x⟩}i, j ) for simplicity.
4 THE PROPOSED MODEL: SECURE XGB
In this section, we first elaborate the secure XGB training algorithm
with the pseudocodes. With the primitives in Section 3.4, we imple-
ment two versions, one is based on SS only and the other utilizes
both HE and SS. We finally present the secure prediction algorithm
and implementation notes.
4.1 Transformation Primitives
As the fundamental components of secure XGB, we first demon-
strate the transformation primitives between HE and SS.
H2S: Transform a HE variable into a SS variable . The primitive
is illustrated in Figure 1 and denoted as:
H2S : (SKA ¦ PKA, [x]A) 7→ (⟨x⟩A ¦ ⟨x⟩B ) . (12)
A B
Input
Output
Process
PKA， <x>A PKA, <x>B
A1. Encrypt <x>A with PKA , get [<x>A]A
[<x>A]A
B1. Encrypt <x>B with PKA , get [<x>B]A
B2. Calculate [<x>A]A+[<x>B]A = [x]A
[x]A
Figure 2: S2H primitive
The original variable x can be a private data or an intermediate
value. On the one hand, x is encrypted by PKA and party B can-
not decrypt the ciphertext. On the other hand, Party A only gets
ciphertext of the random share. Both parties have no access to the
original variable, thus it is transformed securely with the help of
HADD. Symmetrically, for [x]B , we have:
H2S : (PKB , [x]B ¦ SKB ) 7→ (⟨x⟩A ¦ ⟨x⟩B ) . (13)
We denote the transformation as ⟨x⟩ = H2S([x]A) or ⟨x⟩ = H2S([x]B )
for simplicity.
S2H: Transform a SS variable into a HE variable . It is illustrated
in Figure 2 and denoted as:
S2H : (PKA, ⟨x⟩A ¦ PKA, ⟨x⟩B ) 7→ ( ¦ [x]A) . (14)
In this case, Party A acts as encrypter and provides the public key.
Party B receives the encrypted complementary share and computes
the sum to get the related cipertext. Further computations could
be executed by Party B in the HE domain. Because Party B has no
access to SKA, the sum value is secure. HADD is applied as a base
primitive in this transformation as well. Similarly, we have:
S2H : (PKB , ⟨x⟩A ¦ PKB , ⟨x⟩B ) 7→ ([x]B ¦ ) . (15)
We denote the transformation as [x]A = S2H (⟨x⟩) or [x]B =
S2H (⟨x⟩) for simplicity.
Theorem 1. Assume that the additively homomorphic cryptosystem
is indistinguishable under chosen-plaintext attacks. Then, H2S and
S2H are secure in semi-honest models.
Proof. The correctness and security of Theorem 1 can be easily
proved following the simulation proof technique in [17].
4.2 Secure XGB Training Algorithm
We start from the general XGB training in Algorithm 1. The inputs
are a feature matrixX (withM samples andN features) and the label
vector Y . As an additive model, it first makes an initial guess (line
3), followed by the predictions from the T tree models as revisions
(line 8-20), where T is the tree number of XGB. The colon equal
(:=) represents a loop assignment. For example, line 7 assigns the
base score to every element of the prediction vector as the initial
prediction. XGB simplifies the objective function with second-order
approximation. The derivatives are updated during each iteration
(line 11-12) with the previous predictions (line 16&19). By iteratively
calling the BuildTree and PredictTree functions, the tree models
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Algorithm 1 Secure Training Algorithm of XGB
1: function TrainXGB(X ,Y ,T )
2: // Input - X : {x}i, jM×N ,Y : {y}iM
3: f0 = ComputeBaseScore(Y )
4: // Init tree model list
5: F = [f0]
6: // Init prediction vector Yˆ : {yˆ}iM
7: {yˆ}i : = f0
8: for t = 1, 2, ...,T do
9: // Compute current first&second order derivatives
10: // Gt−1 : {дt−1}iM ,Ht−1 : {ht−1}iM
11: Gt−1 = ComputeGradient(Y , Yˆ )
12: Ht−1 = ComputeHessian(Y , Yˆ )
13: // Build a tree based on the derivatives and features
14: ft = BuildTree(Gt−1,Ht−1,X )
15: // Compute prediction of current tree Yˆt : {yˆt }iM
16: Yˆt = PredictTree(ft ,X )
17: // Update the model list and prediction vector
18: F .append(ft )
19: {yˆ}i : = {yˆ}i + {yˆt }i
20: end for
21: return F
22: end function
are constructed to minimize the given loss function. Finally, a model
F is returned with a base score and T trees.
4.3 Secure BuildTree and PredictTree
The calculations of initial guess, first-order derivatives, and second-
order derivatives depend on the specific loss function and can be
computed with the secure computation primitives. So we focus on
the key part of the framework, that is the BuildTree and Predict-
Tree, as will be described in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Secure BuildTree and PredictTree
1: function BuildAndPredict(G,H ,X )
2: // Input - G : {д}iM ,H : {h}iM ,X : {x}
i, j
M×N
3: // Init root node
4: root = Node()
5: // Init sample indicator vector for root node S : {s}iM
6: {s}i : = 1
7: // Init candidate split matrix V : {v}j,kN×K
8: // Get shared ⟨G⟩ : {⟨д⟩}iM , ⟨H ⟩ : {⟨h⟩}iM , ⟨S⟩ : {⟨s⟩}iM
9: {⟨д⟩}i : = N 2S({д}i )
10: {⟨h⟩}i : = N 2S({h}i )
11: {⟨s⟩}i : = N 2S({s}i )
12: // Split nodes from the root
13: ⟨Yˆ ⟩ = SSSplitNode(root , ⟨G⟩, ⟨H ⟩, ⟨S⟩,X ,V )
14: return root , ⟨Yˆ ⟩
15: end function
Algorithm 2 mainly initializes the computation by transforming
the necessary varibles, i.e. first-order derivative vector (G) and
second-order derivative vector (H ) for all the samples, to the SS
domain (line 9-10). For all the nodes in a tree, in order to record
which samples belong to them, we introduce an indicator vector
S for each node. For a certain node, if the i-th sample falls into it,
we set {s}i to 1, otherwise to 0. Naturally, for the root node, all
the samples belong to it, therefore, we initialize all the elements
of its indicator vector to 1 (line 5-6). To further preserve privacy,
we transform the indicator vector to SS variable (line 11). In this
way, the sum of the derivatives of the samples in a single node can
be computed as the inner product of the indicator vector and the
derivative vector, which can be securely computed by SADD &
SMUL primitives.
For better illustration, we set up a split matrix V (line 7), where
K is the bucket number for the candidate splits. The split matrix
has two usages: (i) {x}i, j ∈ {v}j,k .ranдe means that the feature
value of the i-th sample falls into the k-th bucket of the feature j;
(ii) {x}i, j ≤ {v}j,k .value means that the i-th sample belongs to left
branch split by the k-th candidate split value of feature j. Because
the feature matrix is vertically partitioned, the feature splits and
bucket ranges could be precomputed locally without interactions.
For computation efficiency concern, we adopt the global proposal
method in XGB [3] for split candidates.
After initialization, SSSplitNode is called to split the tree top
down from the root node to leaf nodes (line 13). In the process, the
split information is recorded in the Node data structure and the
prediction of current tree ⟨Yˆ ⟩ is finally returned (line 14).
Algorithm 3 describes how to split a node in SS domain. Firstly,
a termination check determines whether a node should split (line
4). When no further split is needed, the node is marked as a leaf
node (line 5). The leaf weight is securely computed with the SS
variables (line 6), where λ is the L2 regularization term described
in Eq. (4). The secretly shared predictions on current node are then
computed by a element-wise secure multiplication (line 8). Note
that, the leaf weight will only be assigned to the samples in this
node and the predictions are set to 0 otherwise (with the original
value {s}i equals to 0).
Next, with the node continue splitting, we enumerate all the split
candidates and choose the best one with the highest gain (line 17-
26). Before that, we compute the current node gain (line 11-13) and
prepare the д&h cumulations in all the feature buckets (line 14-16).
SSSumBucket is in charge of aggregating the д&h in each bucket,
which will be presented in Section 4.4. The best split information
can be computed securely by using SARGMAX primitive (line 26),
which outputs the index of feature bucket with the best gain.
The split feature and split value pair are then reconstructed and
recorded by the feature owner (line 27-29). According to the split
information, we then split the samples into left and right branches
and generate related indicator vectors for child nodes (line 30-44).
Finally, we recursively call the SSSplitNode function to split the
child nodes (line 46-49). Note that the element-wise summation of
⟨Pl ⟩ & ⟨Pr ⟩ combines the predictions of both branches and outputs
the belonging leaf weight for every sample (line 51).
4.4 Secure Bucket Cumulator
We propose two versions of secure bucket cumulator.
SS Bucket Cumulator.We first present how to securely compute
SumBucket in SS domain only in Algorithm 4. The indicator vector
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Algorithm 3 Secure SplitNode based on SS
1: function SSSplitNode(node, ⟨G⟩, ⟨H ⟩, ⟨S⟩,X ,V )
2: // Input - ⟨G⟩ : {⟨д⟩}iM , ⟨H ⟩ : {⟨h⟩}iM , ⟨S⟩ : {⟨s⟩}iM
3: // and X : {x}i, jM×N ,V : {v}
j,k
N×K
4: if terminate then
5: node .isLea f = True
6: node .⟨weiдht⟩ =
∑
i { ⟨s ⟩ }i ·{ ⟨д ⟩ }i∑
i { ⟨s ⟩ }i ·{ ⟨h ⟩ }i+⟨λ ⟩
7: // Compute prediction vector on leaf ⟨Yˆ ⟩ : {⟨y⟩}iM
8: {⟨y⟩}i : = {⟨s⟩}i · node .⟨weiдht⟩
9: return ⟨Yˆ ⟩
10: end if
11: // Compute gain for current node
12: ⟨sд⟩ = ∑i {⟨д⟩}i , ⟨sh⟩ = ∑i {⟨h⟩}i
13: ⟨cдain⟩ = ⟨sд ⟩ · ⟨sд ⟩⟨sh ⟩+⟨λ ⟩
14: // Sum g&h in the k-th bucket of feature j
15: // ⟨BG⟩ : {⟨bд⟩}j,kM×K , ⟨BH ⟩ : {⟨bh⟩}
j,k
M×K
16: ⟨BG⟩, ⟨BH ⟩ = SumBucket(⟨G⟩, ⟨H ⟩,X ,V )
17: for j = 1, 2, ...,N do
18: ⟨sдl ⟩ = N 2S(0), ⟨shl ⟩ = N 2S(0)
19: for k = 1, 2, ...,K do
20: ⟨sдl ⟩ = ⟨sдl ⟩ + {⟨bд⟩}j,k , ⟨sдr ⟩ = ⟨sд⟩ − ⟨sдl ⟩
21: ⟨shl ⟩ = ⟨shl ⟩ + {⟨bh⟩}j,k , ⟨shr ⟩ = ⟨sh⟩ − ⟨shl ⟩
22: // Compute gain matrix⟨Gain⟩ : {⟨дain⟩}j,kN×K
23: {⟨дain⟩}j,k = ⟨sдl ⟩ · ⟨sдl ⟩⟨shl ⟩+⟨λ ⟩ +
⟨sдr ⟩ · ⟨sдr ⟩
⟨shr ⟩+⟨λ ⟩ − ⟨cдain⟩
24: end for
25: end for
26: jbest ,kbest = arg max
j,k
({⟨дain⟩}j,k )
27: // Record split infomation at the party of feature jbest
28: node .splitFeat = jbest
29: node .splitVal = {v}jbest ,kbest
30: // Init sample vectors for left child Sl : {sl }iM
31: // and right child Sr : {sr }iM
32: if {x}i, j ≤ {v}jbest ,kbest .value then {sl }i : = 1
33: else {sl }i : = 0
34: end if
35: {sr }i : = 1 − {sl }i
36: // Get shared ⟨Sl ⟩ : {⟨sl ⟩}iM , ⟨Sr ⟩ : {⟨sr ⟩}iM
37: {⟨sl ⟩}i : = N 2S({sl }i ), {⟨sl ⟩}i : = {⟨sl ⟩}i · {⟨s⟩}i
38: {⟨sr ⟩}i : = N 2S({sr }i ), {⟨sr ⟩}i : = {⟨sr ⟩}i · {⟨s⟩}i
39: // Get shared ⟨Gl ⟩ : {⟨дl ⟩}iM , ⟨Hl ⟩ : {⟨hl ⟩}iM
40: {⟨дl ⟩}i : = {⟨sl ⟩}i · {⟨д⟩}i
41: {⟨hl ⟩}i : = {⟨sl ⟩}i · {⟨h⟩}i
42: // Get shared ⟨Gr ⟩ : {⟨дr ⟩}iM , ⟨Hr ⟩ : {⟨hr ⟩}iM
43: {⟨дr ⟩}i : = {⟨sr ⟩}i · {⟨д⟩}i
44: {⟨hr ⟩}i : = {⟨sr ⟩}i · {⟨h⟩}i
45: // Init left child and right child
46: le f t = Node(), riдht = Node()
47: // Prediction of left/right branch ⟨Pl/r ⟩ : {⟨pl/r ⟩}iM
48: ⟨Pl ⟩ = SSSplitNode(le f t , ⟨Sl ⟩, ⟨Gl ⟩, ⟨Hl ⟩,X ,V )
49: ⟨Pr ⟩ = SSSplitNode(riдht , ⟨Sr ⟩, ⟨Gr ⟩, ⟨Hr ⟩,X ,V )
50: // Combine prediction vectors as ⟨P⟩ : {⟨p⟩}iM
51: {⟨p⟩}i : = {⟨pl ⟩}i + {⟨pr ⟩}i
52: return P
53: end function
Algorithm 4 Secure SumBucket based on SS
1: function SSSumBucket (⟨G⟩, ⟨H ⟩,X ,V )
2: // Input - ⟨G⟩ : {⟨д⟩}iM , ⟨H ⟩ : {⟨h⟩}iM
3: // and X : {x}i, jM×N ,V : {v}
j,k
N×K
4: for j = 1, 2, ...,N do
5: for k = 1, 2, ...,K do
6: if {x}i, j ∈ {v}j,k .ranдe then {sjk }i : = 1
7: else {sjk }i : = 0
8: end if
9: {⟨sjk ⟩}i : = N 2S({sjk }i )
10: // Sum g&h in bucket
11: {⟨bд⟩}j,k = ∑i {⟨sjk ⟩}i · {⟨д⟩}i
12: {⟨bh⟩}j,k = ∑i {⟨sjk ⟩}i · {⟨h⟩}i
13: end for
14: end for
15: return {⟨bд⟩}j,k , {⟨bh⟩}j,k
16: end function
trick is employed again to record whether a sample falls into a
specific bucket (line 6-7). {sjk }i is set to 1 if the i-th sample falls
into the k-th bucket of feature j. {sjk }M is a column vector for
the k-th bucket of feature j. Then the bucket cumulation of д&h
turns out to be the inner product of the indicator vector and the
derivative vector (line 9-12).
HESS Bucket Cumulator. We then implement the SumBucket
based on HESS framework (in Algorithm 5). The key insight is
transforming the д&h into HE domain and cumulating them by the
cipertexts. Both parties first get the variables under HE domains
(line 4-8). Each party initializes the indicator vector for current
bucket (line 11-13) and cummulates the encrypted д&h (line 14-17).
The cumulation of a feature is maintained by the party who owns
it. After the computation, the HE variables are transformed back to
SS variables for further computations (line 18-20). We can see from
Algorithm 5 that, the encrypted д&h are shared among the nodes in
the same tree, thus the ciphertexts only need to be communicated
once. We will theoretically analyze the complexities of SS based
SumBucket and HESS based SumBucket in Section 5.
From now on, we name the secure XGB with SS SumBucket
as SS-XGB, and term the secure XGB with HESS SumBucket as
HESS-XGB.
4.5 Secure XGB Prediction Algorithm
We then present a novel secure XGB prediction algorithm with the
example in Figure 3. The upper part displays the normal prediction
process over a single tree. Prediction starts from the root node
and recursively chooses a child node determined by the split infor-
mation. Moving along the prediction path (shown in red arrows)
until the leaf (n1 → n2 → n5), the corresponding weight (w5) is
finally returned as the prediction. To facilitate the secure version,
we introduce an one-hot indicator vector S to mark the selected
leaf node. The prediction could be regarded as the inner product of
S and W (a vector consists of all leaf weights).
Supposing that the intermediate nodes n1 & n3 are split by party
A and n2 is a dummy node for party A. On the contrary, party
B is only aware of the split information of n2. Leaf weights are
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Algorithm 5 Secure SumBucket based on HESS
1: function HESSSumBucket (⟨G⟩, ⟨H ⟩,X ,V )
2: // Input - ⟨G⟩ : {⟨д⟩}iM , ⟨H ⟩ : {⟨h⟩}iM
3: // and X : {x}i, jM×N ,V : {v}
j,k
N×K
4: // Transform SS variables to HE
5: // [G]A : {[д]A}iM , [G]B : {[д]B }iM
6: {[д]A}i : = S2H ({⟨д⟩}i ), {[д]B }i : = S2H ({⟨д⟩}i
7: // [H ]A : {[h]A}iM , [H ]B : {[h]B }iM
8: {[h]A}i : = S2H ({⟨h⟩}i ), {[h]B }i : = S2H ({⟨h⟩}i
9: for j = 1, 2, ...,N do
10: for k = 1, 2, ...,K do
11: if {x}i, j ∈ {v}j,k .ranдe then {sjk }i = 1
12: else {sjk }i = 0
13: end if
14: // Suppose feature j is at one party P ∈ {A,B}
15: // Sum g&h encrypted by the other party P¯
16: {[bд]P¯ }j,k =
∑
i {sjk }i · {[д]P¯ }i
17: {[bh]P¯ }j,k =
∑
i {sjk }i · {[h]P¯ }i
18: // Transform HE variables to SS
19: {⟨bд⟩}j,k = H2S({[bд]P¯ }j,k )
20: {⟨bh⟩}j,k = H2S({[bh]P¯ }j,k )
21: end for
22: end for
23: return {⟨bд⟩}j,k , {⟨bh⟩}j,k
24: end function
variables under SS domain, each party holds one of the shares.
The output model of our secure training algorithm is distributed
just as we marked in the bottom part of Figure 3. It explains an
innovative way to achieve similar prediction process under the SS
domain. Both parties first generate leaf indicator vector locally. For
each party (e.g., A), if its intermediate node has split information
(e.g. n1 of party A), the unselected branch is abandoned (e.g. n3 of
party A). Otherwise, prediction continues on both branches (e.g.
n2 of party A). The local indicator vector marks all the candidate
leaves with the partial model. Obviously, the intersection of local
indicator vectors is equivalent to the one-hot indicator vector S .
So we transform the local indicator vector to SS domain and get
S with an element-wise multiplication. The prediction now can
be computed efficiently with the weight vector and the indicator
vector under SS domain. By cumulating predictions of all the trees,
we obtain the final prediction of XGB.
4.6 Implementation Details
We now describe several implementation essentials in details.
Algorithm parameters. Our implementation supports most pa-
rameters of XGB, e.g. the number of estimators, the max depth of
a tree, the learning rate, and L2 regularization. Besides, we also
support sampling and pruning. In practice, sampling is an impor-
tant strategy to prevent overfitting and increase the tree diversity,
which includes feature (column) sampling and sample (row) sam-
pling. First, for column sampling, when fitting trees, both parties
locally permute the feature indexes and select features according
to the preset sampling rate. After it, the following computations
n5n4 n6 n7
A B
n2 n3
n5
n1
n4 n6 n7
n5n4 n6 n7
n2 n3
n1
S= [ 0 1 0 0 ]
W= [ w4 w5 w6 w7 ]
<S> = <SA> ⊙ <SB>
n2 n3
n1
<W>A = [ <w4>A <w5>A <w6>A <w7>A ]
SA = [ 1 1 0 0 ]
<W>B = [ <w4>B <w5>B <w6>B <w7>B ]
SB = [ 0 1 1 1 ]
𝑦# = W ・S = w5
<𝑦#> = <W>・<S> = <w5>
Figure 3: Illustration of secure tree prediction
are based on the permuted indexes instead of the original ones.
When recovering the bucket information (line 26 in Algorithm 3),
the split feature index is permuted and the mapping relation is only
available at the owner party, which avoid information leakage. As
for the row sampling, it first takes an extra round of communication
for both parties to agree on the selected samples at the beginning of
Algorithm 2. After it, row sampling can be done by initializing the
selected samples to 1 for the root node (line 6). Pruning is another
important strategy for XGB. The best prune metric is split gain,
which indicates whether a further partition is needed. We simulate
the pruning operation by introducing a dummy bucket and dividing
all samples at left branch, which means that the left child is a copy
of the parent node. In this way, we enjoy the benefit of pruning
without revealing any intermediate values.
Fixed-pointArithmetic.Multi-party computation primitives only
work in a finite field such as integers modulo 2k , which is compu-
tationally beneficial [5]. To support decimal arithmetic, we adopt
truncate based fixed-point representation in [22]. It has been proven
that, with high probability, the reconstructed product is at most 1
bit off in the least significant position of the fractional part. This
small truncation error is generally tolerable for machine learning
applications with sufficient fractional bits. We use 20 out of 64 bits
(i.e. k = 64) to represent the fractional part in practice.
Additively Homomorphic Encryption. Additively homomor-
phic encryption are widely used in practice. We implement two
popular additively homomorphic encryption, i.e., Paillier [25] and
Okamoto-Uchiyama (OU) [24]. We will compare their performance
in experiment. We can further speed up the encryption process by
appropriate pre-computing. Specifically, we find that about 95% of
the time is spending on the random generation and corresponding
exponentiation, which is irrelevant to the plaintext and could be
moved to the offline process. In terms of the transformation prim-
itives mentioned in section 4.1, there is another notable security
concern. Because the plaintext space under the HE domain is Z2l ,
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instead of Z2k , we have to set a security parameter σ and pick the
random number r ∈ Z2k+σ . The probability of information leaking
is then reduced to 2−σ , where we set σ = 40.
Secret Sharing. Online speed-up is also enabled in the SS domain
by generating the Beaver’s triples offline. Zero sharing technique
further reduces the interaction cost with the help of pseudo-random
functions (PRF) [21]. Moreover, sigmoid function is crucial for the
classification problems. We approximate sigmoid function by Tay-
lor expansion and reduce it to SADD & SMUL operations. As the
basis of the SARGMAX, we need two more primitives. One prim-
itive is used to compare two shared values (CMP) and the other
is multiplexers for conditional expressions (MUX). We make use
of Boolean sharing in [22] to implement the CMP primitive by
judging the shared sign bit of the subtraction. A bunch of MUX
operations take the pairwise comparison results and the related
index shares as inputs and finally return the index for the max value.
To accelerate the process, we can utilize binary tree reduction trick.
5 COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we take a close look at the bucket cumulation (Sum-
Bucket) algorithms and give their theoretical complexity analysis.
5.1 Computation Complexity
First, we analyze the computation complexity of SS based Sum-
Bucket in Algorithm 4. To do this, we express it in a concise way
with matrices. First, the indicator vectors ({sjk }) are generated
by enumerating all the features and buckets. Second, the horizon-
tally concatenated vectors form an indicator matrix SM×NK , where
NK = N ×K is the total bucket number. We then transform SM×NK
to SS domain as ⟨S⟩. Next, ⟨G⟩M×1 and ⟨H ⟩M×1 are horizontally
concatenated as well and transposed to a shared matrix ⟨R⟩2×M .
The computation in line 11-12 becomes a shared matrix multipli-
caiton ⟨C⟩2×NK = ⟨R⟩ × ⟨S⟩, where each row is the cumulation
of д or h for all the buckets. Note that the indicator matrix S is a
large sparse 0/1 matrix, while R is a relatively small dense matrix.
Obviously, the size of matrix S is exploded with the feature number.
SS domain cannot handle the sparsity and the computation is as
tedious as the dense matrices.
On the contrary, the HESS based SumBucket in Algorithm 5
makes use of locally generated sparse S directly. With the plaintext
of S , only the necessary computations are executed. However, it in-
volves extra computation under HE domain. We introduce t1, t2, t3
to notate the average encryption time, homomorphic addition time,
and decryption time respectively. It takes 2M · t1 to encrypt the
matrix R (line 6 & 8). In line 16-17, there are two homomorphic
additions for each element in feature matrix because д & h are
added to the corresponding bucket, i.e. 2MN · t2. When transform-
ing the encrypted cumulations [C] to the SS domain (line 19-20),
2NK · t3 is needed for decryption. Overall, the HESS version needs
T 1 = 2M · t1 + 2MN · t2 + 2NK · t3 to cumulate.
5.2 Communication Complexity
The multiplication operation needs communications between two
parties which becomes a bottleneck when it involves large matrices.
Also, sparse matrices are widely used in machine learning and the
heavy communication traffic makes secure algorithms unrealis-
tic. In industry settings, bandwidth bottleneck is harder to break
than computation bottleneck, especially for external collaborations.
Even with the offline Beaver’s Triple generation and Zero sharing, it
still needs online communications [1]. For SS based SumBucket, the
communications are bidirectional and proportional to matrices ⟨R⟩
& ⟨S⟩. Suppose the variables are l1-bits, then, the total communica-
tion costs are LSS = 2 · (MNK + 2M) ·l1 bits. In constract, the HESS
based SumBucket only transfers the encrypted share matrix [⟨R⟩P ]P
to the opposite party P¯ (for S2H) and receives the encrypted shares
[⟨C⟩P ]P (for H2S). Assume the key size is l2-bits, then it spends
LHESS = 2 · (2M + 2NK) · l2 bits.
We now study under what circumstances LSS will be greater
than LHESS . To do this, we let LSS /LHESS > 1, then
2 · (MNK + 2M) · l1
2 · (2M + 2NK) · l2 > 1 ⇒ NK >
2 · l2l1 ·M
M − 2 · l2l1
. (16)
Following the setting in Section 4.6, l1 = 64 and l2 ≈ 2300 (average
ciphertext length for 2048 bits key). We replace them in the above
equation, sinceM is the sample size which is much bigger than 72,
and thus we get
NK >
72M
M − 72
M≫72−−−−−→ NK > 72. (17)
In other words, the HESS version outperforms the SS one in terms
of communication cost when the total bucket number NK > 72.
5.3 Algorithm Choice
HESS-XGB saves the communication time byT 2 = (LSS−LHESS )/B,
where B is the bandwidth limit in practice. But it also brings about
additional homomorphic computation time T1(in section 5.1). By
comparing T 1 and T 2, we can choose a more appropriate one from
the two training algorithms.
6 EXPERIMENT
In this section, we first analyze the choice for Homomorphic Encryp-
tion. Then we study the performance and usability of our secure
XGB on a benchmark dataset. Finally, we present how is secure
XGB applied in our real-world scenario.
6.1 Choice of Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic Encryption plays a key role in the HESS-XGB, so it is
critical to the choose and configure the algorithm. As the previous
description in section 4.6, we implement two of the most popular
algorithms, Paillier and OU, based on libtommath2.
We first compare their running time of Encryption, Decryption
and Homomorphic Addition, which are dominated by the key
size (l ∈ {1024, 2048, 3072}). We repeat each of the operations for
100,000 times and report the total time (in seconds) in Table 1, where
factor denotes the speedup of OU against Paillier. We find that OU
outperforms Pailler over all the operations, and therefore we choose
OU in practice. We also note that the running time grows rapidly
with the increase of key size. In practice, l = 2048 turns out to be
a good choice that meets the requirements for both security and
efficiency.
2https://github.com/libtom/libtommath
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Table 1: Time Test for HE (in seconds)
HE Setting Enc HAdd1⋆ HAdd2† Dec
OU-1024 86.285 0.311 2.388 9.889
Paillier-1024 306.104 1.003 311.189 300.560
Factor 3.55x 3.22x 130.31x 30.39x
OU-2048 432.241 0.914 8.785 28.773
Paillier-2048 1739.590 2.227 1754.110 1966.790
Factor 4.02x 2.44x 199.68x 68.35x
OU-3072 2147.340 1.946 19.680 62.241
Paillier-3072 8344.960 6.549 8404.650 8759.290
Factor 3.89x 3.36x 427.06x 140.73x
⋆ ciphertext+ciphertext †ciphertext+plaintext
Table 2: AUC test for Secure XGB
Secure XGB dep=3 dep=4 dep=5
n_tree=5 0.848859 0.871682 0.908069
n_tree=10 0.870559 0.910726 0.937391
n_tree=20 0.899864 0.938292 0.963428
n_tree=30 0.920106 0.952357 0.973539
XGB dep=3 dep=4 dep=5
n_tree=5 0.855560 0.897462 0.931451
n_tree=10 0.892414 0.929320 0.958429
n_tree=20 0.917860 0.954457 0.971062
n_tree=30 0.934475 0.967075 0.978956
6.2 End-to-end Accuracy Comparison
Settings. To compare our secure XGB with the plaintext XGB in
terms of performance, we conduct a contrast experiment on the
Mnist dataset3, which is widely used in privacy-preserving ma-
chine learning testing [22]. The Mnist dataset has 60,000 training
samples and 10,000 testing samples and each sample is a image of a
handwritten digit from 0 to 9. The grayscale levels of 28 × 28 pixels
make up the 784 features, which are vertically split into two parties
evenly, i.e., we assume each party has 392 features. We take the dig-
its from 0-4 as positive samples and others as negative ones. Then
it becomes a standard binary classification task. We use Area Under
the ROC Curve (AUC) as the evaluation metric. During comparison,
we set the same parameters for all the algorithms. We set learning
rate to 0.3 and sampling rate to 0.7 (for both samples and features).
Results and analysis. We summarize the comparison results in
Table 2. Note that both SS-XGB and HESS-XGB achieves the same
accuracy. We can see that our proposed secure XGB converges
slower than original XGB, and eventually the AUC of secure XGB
is comparable but a little bit lower than that of XGB (0.973539 vs.
0.978956). This is because secure XGB has some nonlinear computa-
tion primitives (e.g. division & sigmoid) which have to be computed
approximated. The little performance loss is totally acceptable, es-
pecially considering its privacy preserving ability.
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Figure 4: Bandwidth Test for HESS and SS
6.3 Efficiency ComparisonEfficiency is another important factor for practical use. We com-
pare the running time of the proposed two method: SS-XGB and
HESS-XGB. The comparison is carried out on a fraction of the Mnist
dataset (with 1,000 samples). We apply the two algorithms by vary-
ing bandwidth in {10, 20, 30, 40, 60, 80, 100} and set the network
delay to 5ms. The algorithm parameters are the same as section
6.2 except that the tree depth is fixed to 4. We report the average
training time for a single tree in Figure 4. From it, we conclude that
HESS-XGB works better than SS-XGB on Mnist dataset, especially
with the decreasing of bandwidth. The result arrives the same con-
clusion as our complexity analysis in section 5. For a specific task, in
practice, one can substitute the data size & operation time in Table
1 to choose the appropriate algorithm (i.e., SS-XGB or HESS-XGB).
Moreover, we observe that HESS-XGB is more memory friendly.
Take Mnist dataset for example, the peak memory of HESS-XGB
is only half of SS-XGB. This is because HESS-XGB stores the local
features in sparse matrices by taking advantage of the vertical data
partition setting. This is a delightful character, considering XGB
algorithm cannot train in a mini-batch way. With a lower memory
cost, HESS-XGB is able to supports larger datasets.
Finally, in order to better study the efficiency of HESS-XGB and
clarify future improvements, we analyze its time allocated during
training procedure. From Figure 5, we find that around 80% of the
time spends on cumulating the encrypted values (HADD, line 16-
17) in Algorithm 5, and over 10% of the time is on encrypting д&h
(A2H, line 5-8) in Algorithm 5. The above results shed light on
how to further improve the efficiency of HESS-XGB for industrial
practitioners, i.e., parallelize encryption and node splitting.
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Figure 5: Operation time percentage during training
3http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
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6.4 Application
We deploy our proposed secure XGB into real-world fraud detec-
tion task for online payment services. As a payment platform, we
facilitate online transaction service and obtain the historical in-
formation for the customers. Traditionally, we build our own risk
control model using XGB. However, the merchants also have pri-
vate transaction data that could be used to further improve risk
control ability. But the data is not allowed to share for the sake of
user privacy and commercial principles. With secure XGB, we can
build secure risk control model together with the merchants. Our
data for this task contains 100,000 samples (70% as training data)
and 50 selected features. The AUC of our individual XGB model
is 0.9778. With extra 30 features from the merchant, the AUC of
secure XGB is improved to 0.9924. The joint model can detect more
potential frauds and significantly reduce capital loss.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we proposed a hybrid-domain framework, combining
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and Secret Sharing (SS), for two
parties to build secure XGB under vertically partitioned data set-
ting. Based on the hybrid-domain primitives, we implemented two
secure XGB training algorithms, i.e., SS-XGB that uses SS only and
HESS-XGB that employs both HE and SS, and one corresponding
prediction algorithm. The complexity analysis shows that SS-XGB
and HESS-XGB have their own advantages. We finally conducted
experiments on benchmark dataset to verify the model performance
and presented our real-world application. In the future, we would
like to focus on the parallel optimization for the proposed secure
XGB algorithms and implement more secure machine learning algo-
rithms for industrial applications based on the flexible framework.
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